Abstract-When multiple job processes are served by a single scheduler, the queueing delays of one process are often affected by the others, resulting in a timing side channel that leaks the arrival pattern of one process to the others. In this work, we study such a timing side channel between a regular user and a malicious attacker. Utilizing Shannon's mutual information as a measure of information leakage between the user and attacker, we analyze privacy-preserving behaviors of common work-conserving schedulers. We find that the attacker can always learn perfectly the user's arrival process in a longest-queue-first (LQF) scheduler. When the user's job arrival rate is very low (near zero), first-come-first-serve (FCFS) and round-robin schedulers both completely reveal the user's arrival pattern. The near-complete information leakage in the low-rate traffic region is proven to be reduced by half in a work-conserving version of TDMA (WC-TDMA) scheduler, which turns out to be privacy-optimal in the class of deterministic working-conserving (det-WC) schedulers, according to a universal lower bound on information leakage we derive for all det-WC schedulers.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
T HAS long been known that event times could be used for covert communication [1] . For instance, by encoding messages in transmission times of events, an event scheduler can create a timing covert channel to any observer that sees the time events occur. Some notable timing covert channels include the CPU scheduling channel [2] , in which one process encodes a message into sizes of the jobs it hands to a CPU shared with another process that decodes this information through monitoring CPU's busy period and the IP timing channel [3] , in which messages are embedded in the interarrival-times of packets.
More recently, it has been shown that event times also incidentally leak information, resulting in timing side channels. Unlike a covert channel, there is no active message sender in a side channel. Instead, an attacker infers information about the other users from the timing evidence left on a shared resource. Such a timing side channel exists between two users sending jobs to the same queue. The queuing delays of one user's jobs convey information about the activities of the other. Timing side channels have been previously exploited to learn the activities of cloud clients and home broadband customers [4] , [5] . In cloud computing infrastructures, such as Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), a server often hosts jobs from multiple clients. This provides a malicious client with the opportunity to probe workloads of his cloud neighbors [4] . Likewise, a timing side channel can be built in the home digital subscriber line (DSL)
router. An attacker pinging the DSL user may learn the user's Web traffic pattern because the pings and the user's packets share the downstream queue at the DSL router [5] .
In this paper, we study a timing side channel that arises when two users share a joint event queue. One user is assumed to be a malicious attacker who wants to learn the other user's job arrival pattern based on the delays his jobs experience. The amount of coupling between the user and attacker's jobs largely depends on the scheduling policy of the job server. A scheduler certainly can eliminate the side channel by applying a time-division multiple access (TDMA) policy, which decouples service to the users but adds unnecessary delays. On the other hand, in work-conserving schedulers, which achieve delay optimality by keeping busy as long as the queue is not empty, timing side channels are inevitable. More discussions about designing scheduler policies from a privacy perspective can be found in [6] . Kadloor et al. [7] characterized the information leakage of work-conserving schedulers for an attacker that could issue infinitesimally small jobs. This raises the question: Could side channel information leakage be alleviated if the attacker is not allowed to issue jobs with arbitrarily small sizes? In fact, in many real systems, there are requirements on acceptable job sizes. For instance, the limit on network packet sizes often prefixes [8] . We answer this question by considering a scenario where users are required to send jobs of comparable sizes. Additionally, we measure the leakage of a scheduler in terms of performance of the best attacker who aims to learn the exact arrival times of the user's jobs. This is a departure from [7] , where the attacker's goal was to learn the total number of user's jobs in each clock period, as opposed to the user's arrival process, which is the goal of this work. The current metric captures loss in privacy of the user more "accurately." The aim of this work is to provide theoretic evidence that deterministic work-conserving policies all suffer from a privacy flaw. Thus, in privacysensitive applications, information leakage of a policy should be a design criteria alongside other QoS requirements such as delay and throughput. To do so, we find an attack (possibly a suboptimal one) that still suffices to demonstrate the significant 1063-6692 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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amount of information leakage. Our main contributions of this work are summarized in the following.
• We develop an information-theoretic framework to analyze timing side channels in job schedulers. Considering a scheduler serving a user and an attacker, we measure the information leakage using Shannon's mutual information between the user's job arrival process and the attacker's job arrival and departure processes.
• We demonstrate that most commonly deployed work-conserving scheduling policies are not privacy-optimal: The longest-queue-first (LQF) scheduler leaks the user's arrival pattern completely; when the user's job arrival rate is near zero, both first-come-first-serve (FCFS) and roundrobin schedulers completely reveal the user's arrival pattern, while a work-conserving TDMA-like scheduler leaks the user's arrival process half of the time.
• We derive a lower bound on information leakage for all deterministic work-conserving (det-WC) schedulers, where the server takes deterministic actions and stays busy as long as there are jobs to serve. The lower bound shows that in the low-rate traffic region, the attacker learns the user's arrival pattern for at least half of the time. The implication of this study is that deploying det-WC schedulers in applications, in which privacy is a concern, is a poor choice.
II. RELATED WORK
Traditionally, timing channels are mostly studied in the context of covert communication. Most of the literature focuses on the capacity of such channels. Anantharam and Verdú [9] studied the timing channel between the arrival and departure process of a single user queue and showed that capacity is minimized when the service times of jobs are exponentially distributed. For such a queue, bounds on the capacity for Bounded Service Timing Channels (BSTC), in which the service time distributions have bounded support, were derived in [10] . Riedl et al. [11] considered the usage of the aforementioned channel with finite-length codewords and obtained a lower bound on the maximal rate achievable. A covert channel between two job processes sharing a round-robin scheduler was studied in [2] . Assuming all jobs have the same size, it was proved that the channel capacity is bits per time-slot. Strategies for mitigating timing covert channels were studied in [12] - [15] . The main proposed countermeasure idea is to weaken the correlation between event times seen by the sender and receiver via injecting "dummy" delays.
On the application side, timing side channels were exploited in network traffic analysis to compromise user anonymity. In [16] , round-trip times (RTTs) of probe packets sent to routers were measured to estimate available bandwidths at the router, which were subsequently used to expose the identity of relays participating in a circuit of the anonymous communication networks, such as Tor [17] or MorphMix [18] . In [19] , Kiyavash et al. designed and implemented a spyware communication circuit in the widely used carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol, using the timing channel resulting from transmission of packets. In [5] and [20] , it was shown that an attacker can create a timing side channel inside a DSL router using frequent pings and recover DSL user's traffic pattern from monitored RTTs. Queuing side channels in shared queues were analyzed in [7] and [21] , where the information leakage was measured by minimum mean square error and equivocation, respectively. With the goal of measuring the number of jobs from the user in a clock period, it was shown in both [7] and [21] that an FCFS scheduler completely leaked the user's traffic pattern if the attacker could send at least one job in every clock period. Additionally, assuming the attacker was able to issue jobs with infinitesimal sizes, it was proven in [7] that round robin is privacy-optimal among all work-conserving schedulers, yet it leaks substantial information about the user.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we introduce the notation and system model. Throughout this section: bold script denotes the infinite sequence denotes the finite sequence , and denotes the subsequence , where .
A. System Model
We consider the timing side channel in a scheduler processing jobs from a regular user and a malicious attacker in discrete time, as depicted by Fig. 1 . In each time-slot, the user (and the attacker) either issues one job or remains idle. All jobs (both from the user and attacker) have the same size and take one time-slot to service. The user sends jobs according to a Bernoulli process with rate . The attacker, who wants to infer the user's arrival times, picks time-slots according to his attack strategy and sends jobs with the long-term rate , not exceeding , in order to preserve the queue's stability. We assume all arrival and departure events occur at the beginning of time-slots. Our model is motivated by practical attacks in real-world schedulers, where attackers can infer sensitive information about a user sharing the same queue. One example is the side-channel-based remote traffic analysis introduced in [20] . The threat model there is that an attacker keeps monitoring the buffer sizes of a user's home DSL link by measuring the round-trip times (RTT) of a sequence of ICMP (or TCP) probe packets sent to the user's home IP address. Akin to our shared queue model, the RTTs attacker's ping packets and the user's downloaded packets are highly correlated. This leaks the "shape" of the user's traffic to the attacker. It has been further demonstrated that this attack causes serious privacy threats, e.g., the attacker learns which Web page the user is visiting [5] . Another example is that of CPU scheduler channel discussed in [22] , in which a CPU processes jobs from two sources with different security levels. In that scenario, similarly the CPU inadvertently leaks information about the job pattern of a process to another through the waiting times.
B. Information Leakage Metric
We measure information leakage in this timing side channel by Shannon's mutual information between the user's arrival process and the attacker's observations, composed of his arrival and departure times. Similar metrics, e.g., Shannon's equivocation, have been frequently used for quantifying information leakage in communication systems, such as the wiretap channel [23] . Denote the arrival event sequence of the user's jobs in each time-slot by , where , and denote the arrival and departure times of the attacker's jobs by and , respectively. Definition 1: The information leakage of a timing side channel in a queue shared by a user and an attacker is defined as (1) where denotes Shannon's mutual information, is the user's arrival rate, and is the number of jobs the attacker has issued by time (2) The leakage characterizes the information gain of the attacker deploying the best possible attack strategy satisfying the rate restriction. Hence, a larger leakage signifies a larger compromise in the user's privacy through the timing side channel. Let denote the entropy rate of the user's arrival process, which is assumed to be Bernoulli.
Definition 2: Define the information leakage ratio of a timing side channel in a queue shared by a user and an attacker as
The information leakage ratio is a better metric for comparing the leakage across users with varying rates. (and ) clearly depends on the scheduling policy. For instance, for the TDMA policy, in which fixed time-slots are preassigned for serving each arrival process, both and are zero as service times of the attacker's jobs are statistically independent of the user's arrival pattern. Unfortunately, TDMA is wasteful and adds significant delays by causing the scheduler to idle. Therefore, such complete isolation of users' job processes is often not desired in practice. In this work, we analyze the information leakage of timing channels in work-conserving (delay-optimal) schedulers and investigate whether good policies that are simultaneously privacy-and delay-optimal exist.
IV. INFORMATION LEAKAGE IN DETERMINISTIC WORK-CONSERVING SCHEDULERS
In this section, we characterize or derive bounds on the leakage in the class of deterministic work-conserving (det-WC) schedulers. These schedulers service jobs in a deterministic fashion and do not idle as long as there are jobs in the queue. Our main results are summarized in Fig. 2 .
We show that even when the attacker is required to send jobs of a comparable size to the user, all det-WC schedulers leak at least half of the user's traffic pattern in the low-rate region. This Fig. 2 . Information leakage ratios in deterministic work-conserving schedulers. In LQF, the user's arrival process is completely leaked to the attacker, which also occurs in the FCFS and round-robin schedulers when the user's rate is very low. A work-conserving TDMA scheduler reduces the fraction of leaked information in the low-rate region by half; the lower bound on the leakage of WC-TDMA is tight at .
is proved by deriving a universal lower bound for all det-WC schedulers as depicted in Fig. 2 . The attacker learns completely the arrival process of the user in an LQF scheduler by simply maintaining his own queue length at one (the flat solid line at the top in Fig. 2) . In an FCFS scheduler, instead of the exact arrival times, the attacker can infer the number of jobs (arrivals) of the user between any of his two consecutive jobs by sampling the queue at his maximum rate. This leads to a severe leakage in the arrival process of a user with low arrival rate (the blue solid curve in Fig. 2 ), as the attacker can sample the queue frequently enough to obtain an accurate estimate of the user's arrival event in each time-slot. We derive a lower bound on the privacy leakage for round robin (the green dashed curve in Fig. 2 ), which can be achieved by an attacker who issues a new job right after his previous job is serviced. This attack strategy allows the attacker to detect when the user's queue gets empty, and it provides sufficient information about the user's arrival pattern at the low-rate region, resulting in a complete information leakage when the user's arrival rate (see Fig. 2 ). The near-complete information leakage in the low-rate region is alleviated by the work-conserving TDMA (WC-TDMA) scheduler. Like TDMA, the WC-TDMA scheduler reserves slots for each arrival process; e.g., odd slots for the user and even ones for the attacker. However, in each time-slot, if the preassigned user has no jobs, the scheduler serves the other user with jobs waiting for service. Such work-conserving behavior enables the attacker to correctly detect arrivals on time-slots reserved by the user. We derive a lower bound on the leakage of a WC-TDMA scheduler, which is proved to be tight when the user's rate (the orange dashed curve in Fig. 2 ). This means the attacker can learn the arrival pattern of a low-rate user perfectly half the time, and further implies that for , WC-TDMA is a privacy-optimal policy in the det-WC class as it meets the det-WC universal lower bound.
We also performed simulations for the round robin and WC-TDMA lower bounds using synthesis user traffic and calculated the numerical bounds using MATLAB. The simulation results match the bounds we obtained from analytical derivations, as can be seen in Fig. 2 . 
A. Longest-Queue-First
We first analyze the leakage of an LQF scheduler, which we can exactly characterize. In each time-slot, the LQF scheduler services the first buffered job from the user that has more jobs queued up so far. In the case of a tie, the scheduler serves a predetermined user first.
Since the LQF scheduler takes actions by comparing queue lengths of users, a smart attacker can accurately learn the change in the user's queue state by maintaining his queue length constantly at one. Assuming the user has priority of service at a tie, such an attacker always knows whenever the user's queue size passes 0 and detects every job sent by the user, as further explained below.
Theorem IV.1: The information leakage of an LQF scheduler serving a user and an attacker is given by (4) where is the user's arrival rate. Consequently, , for all . Proof: Consider a nonstop monitoring attack strategy (Fig. 3) , where the attacker issues a new job immediately after his previous is serviced. Recall in our model, all arrival and departure events happen at the beginning of time-slots. Thus, in the nonstop monitoring attack, we have (5) Such an attacker always has a single job in the queue. Assume the user gets served first when a tie happens. Then, the scheduler never serves the attacker unless the user has no job left. As a result, whenever the user issues a new job, the attacker experiences a time-slot of delay, i.e., if s.t. otherwise (6) Similarly, if the attacker has priority of service when there is a tie in queue lengths, he would get served if and only if the user's queue length falls below 2, in which case (6) holds. This can be easily proved as follows. Recall that our attack strategy always keeps one job in the attacker's queue. If the attacker has priority of service and the user has only one job in the queue, the server will always serve the attacker first. To receive services, the user needs to send another job, in which case the attacker experiences one slot of delay. Thus, the attack can always detect the arrival of a new job from the user. Hence, we can obtain a lower bound on information leakage that results from the nonstop-monitoring attack as follows: (7) Fig. 4. Periodic sampling: Given a sampling rate , the attacker issues jobs (solid) periodically, with interarrival times chosen from and . For example, if , the interarrival time would take value of 2 and 3 with equal probability.
where and follow from (5) and (6), respectively. Additionally, since the leakage is always upper-bounded by the total entropy rate of the user's arrival process, , we have . LQF is a low-complexity approximation of the MaxWeight scheduling, a throughput-optimal algorithm applied in network switches [24] . It requires less buffer storage than other common scheduling algorithms, such as FCFS and round robin [25] . However, as seen in Theorem IV.1, LQF fully exposes arrival pattern of the user to an attacker.
B. First-Come-First-Serve
FCFS is a simple service policy widely applied in network systems. At each time-slot, the FCFS scheduler services the job at the head of the queue. 1 FCFS reveals the queue length of the buffer to an attacker through queueing delays of his jobs because (8) where "1" accounts for the service time of the th attacker's job. As a result, the attacker can frequently sample the state of the buffer queue and estimate the number of the user's arrivals.
Let denote the counting function associated with the user's arrivals at time , then (9) The following theorem on optimal sampling of a Bernoulli processes is necessary for proving our main result on information leakage of the FCFS scheduler. For the ease of notation, we define in the following: (10) Theorem IV.2: Consider sampling a Bernoulli arrival process at times . For a fixed sampling rate , the following periodic sampling strategy (Fig. 4) is optimal: w.p. w.p.
1 As our we focus is on deterministic policies, the server always gives priority to one user when two jobs from both users arrive together. For convenience, we assume that when both the user and the attacker issue a job in one time-slot, the attacker's job enters the queue first. Our result in Theorem IV.3 also applies to the case where the user's job enters the queue first.
The optimality is defined in the sense of maximizing the entropy rate of the sampled process. This optimal value is given by (12) Proof: See Appendix-A. Theorem IV.3: The information leakage of an FCFS scheduler serving a user and an attacker is given by (13) where is the user's arrival rate, and 's are i.i.d. random variables. If
, (13) is simplified to .
In particular, in the low-rate region, the user's arrival pattern is completely leaked to the attacker (14) Proof: We first prove the converse part of (13) by showing that there exists no attack strategy that allows the attacker to learn more information than (13) .
From (1) and (8), we have (15) where is the number of the user's jobs that have arrived between time and and . results from the application of data processing inequality [26, Theorem 2.8.1] to the Markov chain (16) follows from the fact that is a deterministic function of and , and results from the Markov chain (17) which is proved as follows. The update equation of the queue lengths seen by the attacker is given by (18) for . By induction, (18) and (8) imply that and can be calculated from . Additionally, the arrival time of each of attacker's jobs only depends on the departure time of the previous job, i.e., only depends on . In summary, given does not provide extra information about ; thus, the Markov chain in (17) .
Recall the counting function in (9) . The number of user's jobs sent by time is . Hence, (15) can be rewritten as (19) This implies that the attacker learns at most a sampled version of the user's arrival process through this side channel.
From (2), (19) can be rewritten as (20) where follows from the definition of the attacker's job rate: and follows from the fact that , which follows from (2). Applying (12) (21) where follows because is a monotonically increasing function of [27, Theorem 3] . This completes the proof for the converse.
To prove the achievability of (13), we consider the periodic sampling strategy defined in (11) and derive a lower bound on the information leakage, which turns out to meet the upper bound in (13) . See Appendix-B. Once (13) is proven, we take the limit of leakage ratio as (22) where holds because according to (10) and follows from the Bernoulli distribution of 's. Theorem IV.3 proves that the attacker can recover the number of user's jobs arriving in each sampling period, which becomes an accurate estimate of the user's job arrival pattern if the sampling frequency is high. When the user sends jobs at a very low rate, the attacker can sample the queue state almost every time-slot, and thus would learn the user's arrival pattern completely (See Fig. 2 ).
C. Round Robin
The next policy we study is round robin, where two users take turns to receive services. In each time-slot, the service is switched to the next user who has jobs waiting in the queue; the scheduler never serves any single user continuously unless the other user runs out of jobs. To derive a lower bound on the information leakage, we consider the nonstop monitoring attack introduced in Section IV-A (Fig. 3) , where the job arrival times and departure times satisfy (5). For round robin, this attack forces the scheduler to serve the attacker continuously if possible. As a result, the attacker learns when the user's queue becomes empty, as illustrated in Fig. 5 , or if if (23) Notice in (23) the time gap between two consecutive departures of attacker is at most two time-slots. Hence, this attack only applies when the user's rate . Define the busy period of the system as the time gap between two times when the attacker finds the user's queue is empty, and denote the th busy period by . 's can be written as (24) What the attacker learns from the side channel is summarized by the busy period sequence . Theorem IV.4: The leakage of a round-robin scheduler serving a user and an attacker is lower-bounded by for (25) where is the user's arrival rate, is the random variable distributed as if otherwise (26) where . In particular, when the user's rate is very low, the attacker learns completely the user's traffic pattern, i.e., (27) Proof: Similar to (7), the nonstop monitoring attack results in a lower bound on the leakage given by (28) where holds because the attacker's departure times for the round-robin scheduler are deterministic once the user's arrival pattern is known. From (5) and (23), we have (29) where follows from the definition of busy periods in (24) . It can be further shown that the busy periods seen by the attacker, 's, are i.i.d. as (26) and have mean . The proof is presented in Appendix-E. Therefore, plugging (29) into (28) proves (25) . Additionally, taking the limit of (25) at , the leakage ratio is lower-bounded as (30) where holds by plugging in the PMF of random variable in (26) only for the terms and . The limit on the right-hand side of inequality goes to 1 as . This completes the proof.
Round robin is one of the simplest scheduling algorithms in multiprocessor operation systems and known for fairness [28] . However, our analysis shows that in the low-rate region, the round-robin scheduler almost entirely leaks a user's traffic pattern through the timing side channel (see Fig. 2 ).
D. Work-Conserving TDMA
The schedulers analyzed so far all leak substantial information about the user's traffic, especially when the user's job arrival rate is low. This imposes serious threat to user privacy since many network systems have light workloads. In fact, studies have shown that average server utilization in real-world data centers is only about 5%-20% [29] . In this section, we study WC-TDMA, a tweak of TDMA, which can reduce the information leakage in the low-rate traffic region by half.
In WC-TDMA, time-slots are preassigned to the user and attacker equally. Unlike TDMA, if in some slot the reserved user has no jobs left, the WC-TDMA scheduler serves the other user who has jobs waiting in the queue. For the sake of convenience, we assume all odd time-slots are assigned to the user, and all even slots are assigned to the attacker.
We consider an attack strategy, where the attacker sends a job in each odd slot and stays idle in all even slots, i.e., (31) Clearly, this attack consumes half of the service capacity, so is only applicable when the user's rate . Since odd time-slots are reserved for the user, the attacker's jobs sent on those slots would experience delays as follows: if and otherwise (32) Therefore, the attacker learns the time-slots when the queue is empty and the user has not issued jobs.
Define the "busy period," , as the gap between two successive times the attacker sees an empty queue. Then and (33) Theorem IV.5: The information leakage ratio of a WC-TDMA scheduler serving a user and an attacker is lower-bounded by for (34) where is the user's rate, and r.v. is distributed as (26) . Proof: As in (28) in the proof of Theorem IV.4, we have
where follows from (31) and (32), and follows from (33) . In Appendix F, it is shown that the busy periods seen by the attacker, 's, are i.i.d. as (26) and have mean . Hence, (35) implies the desired lower bound.
Corollary IV.6: The information leakage of a WC-TDMA scheduler serving a user and an attacker is given by if (36)
Proof: Taking the limit of (35) at , we get
where follows from (30). We subsequently derive an upper bound on the leakage ratio. Define to be the earliest time when the th attacker's job can receive service. Then, , and we have
where follows from the fact that the attacker is served with priority in even time-slots, i.e., , where is even. On the other hand, since the user is served first during the odd time-slots, similar to (32) (42) which is less than because at most half of time-slots are odd. Equation (42) together with (37) prove (36).
E. Deterministic Work-Conserving Schedulers
In this section, we derive a universal lower bound on the information leakage for the class of det-WC schedulers, where the scheduler's actions are deterministic (the same arrival instances result in the same departure events), and the scheduler can idle only if there are no jobs in the queue.
Theorem IV.7: The information leakage of a det-WC scheduler serving a user and an attacker is lower-bounded by (43) where is the user's arrival rate, and is the only root of the equation (44) outside the unit circle.
Proof: We again consider the periodic-sampling attack, , defined in (11), under which the mutual information between the attacker's observation and the user's arrival pattern is given by (45) where follows from the entropy chain rule. holds because, given and , queue lengths at all time-slots up to time are known.
Define as the indicator of the attacker's arrival event in time-slot . Following (11), 's are i.i.d. as w.p. w.p.
Applying (46) to (45), we have
At some time-slot , assume the scheduler serves the user first when a tie of queue length occurs. Additionally, assume the queue is empty, i.e.,
, and the attacker issues a new job, i.e.,
. As argued before, in this case the attacker knows whether the user issued a job or not in this slot without ambiguity. Since the scheduler does not know the users' identities, in the worst case of, the user has priority for at least half of time-slots. Therefore, the afore mentioned scenario would at least occur with probability by . Plugging this into (47), we have (48) We next derive the probability that the attacker sees an empty queue,
. From (11), we can write the update equation for queue lengths sampled by the attacker as (49) where 's are i.i.d. as
where . The probability of the attacker seeing an empty queue can be derived by calculating -transform of in the steady state [30, Eq. (3)], which is given by (51) where is the only root of outside the unit circle. Equations (48) and (51) readily imply (43). We plot the numerical solution of the bound in (43) in Fig. 2 . As can be seen, the attacker always gains a significant amount of information of the user in a det-WC scheduler, especially when the user's rate is below 0.5. More specifically, as , the user's traffic pattern is leaked for at least half of the time. (52) and (58). Finally, it is easy to verify that the sampled process by the periodic-sampling strategy has the same entropy rate as given by the bound in (61), which completes the proof for (12) .
B. Proof of Achievability in Theorem IV.3
For the achievability of (13), we need to show
Proof: Let denote the departure times of the attacker's jobs applying the periodic sampling attack strategy defined in (11) . We have a lower bound on the information leakage as (62)
Rewrite the mutual information in (62) as follows: (63) where follows from (8) , is the total number of the user's jobs that have arrived between the times and follows from the Markov chain in (16) , and holds because is independent of . Substituting (63) into (62), we have (64), shown at the bottom of the page.
Applying the entropy chain rule to the second term in (64) which readily implies , which is the desired result.
D. FCFS Scheduler Under a Periodic Sampling Attack Theorem A.3:
In an FCFS scheduler with total job arrival rate below 1, when the attacker applies the periodic-sampling strategy defined in (11), the tuples , form a positive recurrent Markov chain.
Proof: We first prove that , form a positive recurrent Markov chain. The Markovian property directly follows from the FCFS policy and memoryless property of the user's arrival process; given the queue length at , future queue states are independent with the past arrival history.
We show the ergodicity using the Lyapunov function
Recall the arrival rates of the user and attacker by and , respectively. If , the scheduler is guaranteed to be busy from to . Hence, from (66) 
E. Busy Period Distribution of the Round-Robin Scheduler
The user sends jobs according to a Bernoulli arrival process with rate , and the attacker applies the nonstop monitoring attack of (5). We prove the busy periods seen by the attacker, 's, defined in (24) 
Given (87) and (88), we can draw a Markov chain formed by , as depicted by Fig. 6 . The length of busy period is simply a function of the number of transitions, , it takes to return back to state 0 (starting from state 0) (89) Clearly, has the same PMF as 's. For the chain in Fig. 6 (90)
For
, the queue length first needs one step to jump to state 1, and then returns to state 0, which has the probability (91)
, after jumping to state 1 for first time, the queue state needs to experience another transitions before returning to state 1 for the last time and eventually returning back to state 0. Notice that each state transition either increases the queue length by 1, decreases the queue length by 1, or keeps the queue length unchanged. Therefore, the intermediate transitions must contain the same number of transitions that increase and decrease the queue length. Moreover, the increase in the queue length must always lead the decrease; otherwise, the queue would return to state 0 before the require number of transitions finish. Define to be the total ways of transitions with transitions increasing the queue (also transitions decreasing the queue). Then, , where is the famous Catalan number, . The transition probability for can be calculated as
Equations (89)-(92) together prove (26) . In each busy period, the number of queue state transitions equals the number of attacker's job arrivals. Since the attacker's arrival rate in this nonstop-monitoring attack is , thus , which together with (89) imply (86).
F. Busy Period Distribution of the WC-TDMA Scheduler
Consider a WC-TDMA scheduler serving a user and an attacker, where even and odd time-slots are reserved to the attacker and user, respectively. The user sends jobs according to Bernoulli arrival process with rate , and the attacker sends jobs on all odd slots according to (31) . We prove the busy periods seen by the attacker, 's as defined in (33) , are i.i.d. as (26) and have mean for (93)
Proof: Based on (31) and (87), the evolution of queue state, , can be described by the chain in Fig. 6 , and the busy period is a function of the number of transitions, , it takes to return to state 0 starting from state 0 (94)
Using the same arguments in our proof of (26) in Appendix-E, it is clear that 's are distributed as (26) . Additionally, from (89), (94), and (86), .
G. Proof of (41)
We need to prove that , where . Proof: We prove this by induction. The base case is straightforward, considering the queue length starts with zero, i.e.,
. Now assume it is true that for . Consider the update equation of queue length, as given by (95) from which we calculate the probability of empty queue as (96) where follows from the assumption.
